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PANEL DISCUSSION: THE CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE NAFTA LABOR
COOPERATION AGREEMENT
MODERATOR: JAMES F. SMITH,*
PANEL MEMBERS: LANCE A. COMPA,**
ROBERT E. HERZSTEIN,***
MICHAEL J. O'NEILL,**** JORGE F. PEREZ-LOPEZ*****
James F. Smith: Let us first take a look at the issue of trade and
social agreements concerning the environment, labor, and the relations
between them. Although the economic integration process in this hemisphere is very different from the process of the European Union, there
are some points of common experience that are worth reflection. It is
true that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 was born
in conditions of fierce world trade competition and has not yet had time
to evolve. The idea of bringing together U.S. capital and technology with
Mexican labor to more effectively compete in the world economy without
the problems of adversarial, confrontational proceedings to drag down
that competitive posture is certainly unique to NAFTA.
The European Union has a very different origin. First, it has been
around for about fifty years. Second, it was motivated by a desire in
Europe after World War II to avoid yet another bloody continental War.
Political integration as well as economic integration were contemplated.
Nevertheless, environmental and labor agreements were not adopted in
the European Union until 1986.
In addition to these contrasts, there are some points of comparison.
It is certainly commonplace in the European Union to hear about the
dangers of social dumping, labor migration and dislocation of workers
in the absence of common standards of labor protection. Complaints
come not only from individual workers, but from producers who allege
they are being harmed by unfair competition. In our hemisphere, public
exposure and discussion of labor and environmental problems will go a
long way towards finding a solution. Social. dumping, the runaway shops,
the U.S. corporate migration south to avoid labor protection, the migration of Mexican workers north because of the absence of wage and
working condition protections are problems of the past that continue to
be of concern.
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By looking at the legal mechanisms in the European Union which
address these issues, one will discover some interesting parallels. In the
European Union, the primary dispute settlement forum is the European
Court of Justice, which is a supernational institution functioning somewhat
like the U.S. Supreme Court, with power to strike down member-state
legislation inconsistent with community policy. Obviously, the European
Union is a far cry from NAFTA. However, in comparison, the European
Court of Justice has adopted the "direct effects doctrine," which reads
similar to what was published in the FederalRegister by the United States
National Administrative Office (NAO). 2 This doctrine provided the rationale for investigating a labor dispute about the alleged barriers to
freedom of association and collective bargaining in Mexico. It was alleged
that such barriers affect the labor market and the individual; therefore,
they should be looked at in terms of their effects on overall trade policy.
We are a long way from evolving under NAFTA to avoid confrontation
between labor, management, government and financial institutions. Nevertheless, there are some neutral process issues that offer hope.
3
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC),
for example, provides not only for multilateral remedies, but for unilateral
remedies as well. Additionally, the NAO has some prerogatives, which
are briefly described in the NAALC, to investigate circumstances affecting
labor in the other Parties' territory. Although harmonization of law
clearly does not seem to be contemplated, might this evolve into some
kind of greater cooperation in enforcement of parallel measures? These
are all issues that our speakers can shed light on.
Lance Compa: Despite a very strong emphasis in the direction of
cooperation, the NAALC runs on two tracks: the cooperative track and
the contention track. The cooperative track has provided for the exchange
of information and technical assistance. The cooperative aspect of the
labor side agreement is on a solid foundation, but there is also an element
of contention. Whenever a procedure involves fines or trade sanctions,
there is going to be a clash of interests. Clearly, the negotiators of the
NAALC engaged in some tough negotiation over just what the proper
balance between cooperation and contention would be.
The contention track can commence in one of two ways. It can
commence at the NAO level. The NAALC differs from the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), 4 which does
not establish such national bodies. Under the NAAEC, disputes go directly
to a dispute resolution panel and to an equivalent of the NAO's Evaluation
Committee of Experts. On the other hand, under the NAALC, the NAO
of each country can, sua sponte, review an issue that might concern it.
Reviews can also be initiated by a complaint-based process. 5 The language

2.
3.
I.L.M.
4.
5.

Notice of Hearing, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,492 (1994).
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
1499 [hereinafter NAALCI.
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.
NAALC, supra note 3, art. 16.
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of the agreement provides for a "submission. ' 6 Parties can make submissions, and the submissions may or may not be accepted by an NAO
for review.
Thus far, there has not been any effort to undertake a sua sponte
review process by any of the NAOs. The Honeywell and General Electric
submissions to the NAO are the first experience in the submission-driven
process of review. 7 Both cases involve allegations by U.S.-based unions
and by Mexican workers. U.S. unions cooperated with the Mexican trade
unions and workers in trying to establish Mexican affiliates, subsidiaries
or related companies of the parent U.S. corporations, and allege that
employees were fired because they tried to form a union in Mexico. Such
a discharge would be unlawful in Mexico, the United States, or Canada.
The basic right to form or join a trade union is one of the fundamental
international labor rights of the International Labor Organization (ILO). 8
Honeywell and General Electric, for their part, deny the allegations. They
agree that some of the workers were indeed fired, but maintain the
discharges were for misconduct unrelated to union activity. The companies
state that other discharges were simply the result of a normal economic
downturn.
The right of association and the right to organize are among those
subjects that can only be treated by the NAO process. These issues cannot
go forward to any Evaluation Committee of Experts or to the dispute
resolution system that might result in sanctions. A forum where workers
or trade unions can voice their complaints or "submissions" was created.
It is not a judicial or adversarial proceeding, and there is no real
enforcement at the end of the process. Although this is new in relation
to NAFTA, similar forums exist in many other institutions. For example,
the Generalized System of Preferences 9 under U.S. law provides a forum
for raising claims of labor rights abuses in which the conduct of individual
companies may be examined. The ILO and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development have guidelines for the conduct of multinational corporations. These guidelines also include labor provisions which
provide a forum for complaints involving multinational corporations.
The European Union has quite an advanced system of labor rights.
In fact, claims involving U.S.-based multinationals in the European Union
may be adjudicated there. Thus, such a forum is not something extraordinary, even where the interplay between economic development, trade
and labor relations, and the activities of multinational companies are
involved.

6. Id.
7. U.S. National Administrative Office, Public Report of Review, NAO Submission No. 940001
[Honeywell] and NAO Submission No. 940002 [General Electrici (Bureau of International Labor
Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor, Oct. 12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
8. The ILO is a United Nations-related entity that fashions labor rights and standards adopted
by government, business and labor delegates at the ILO's annual conference.
9. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988) (This system provides trade benefits for lesser-developed

countries.).
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The submissions made to the U.S. NAO refer to two basic instruments.
One is the NAALC itself and the other is the set of guidelines that was
adopted by the NAO. 10 Like any legal instrument, the words or phrases
in those instruments can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. The NAO
has been walking a careful line down the middle, neither too narrow
nor too expansive. The result of this is that each of the two communitiesthe employer community and the trade union community-are angry at
the NAO and think the other side got everything it wanted. A letter
from the Council for International Business summarizes the employer
community's view of how this issue should have been handled. 1
Briefly, the letter argues that the NAO should not have accepted the
submissions of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers because they involve events which
took place before January 1, 1994,12 the effective date of NAFTA. The
alleged firings took place in November 1993. The letter also claims that
a pattern of nonenforcement by the Mexican government must be shown
and that these cases are individual cases which do not establish a pattern
and are, therefore, not appropriate for review. 3 An argument is also
made that submissions in these cases spoke insufficiently to enforcement.
Although I believe the submissions do speak to the enforcement issue,
they speak more directly to the claim of violations by the companies.
The employer community claims that this- is really an effort to use the
NAO as a substitute for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
and that it is not appropriate. A case also is made in the letter that the
NAO should not accept submissions until domestic procedures have been
exhausted,1 4 which constitutes a narrow reading of the NAALC.
This position is not correct. It is more than a question of narrow
versus expansive reading. The problem is that it confuses the scope of
review available to the NAO with the scope of review specified in the
agreement for the Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) 5 and the
dispute resolution panels. The NAALC also allows each country to set
up its NAO the way that it wants, so long as it complies with the
agreement. 6 These three issues, (1) the question of events after January 1,
1994, (2) the requirement for a pattern of a practice of nonenforcement,
and (3) the question of enforcement as the key issue, do not arise in
the side agreement itself until the discussion of the ECE and the dispute
settlement panels.
The hearing before the NAO on the labor union submissions took
place on September 12, 1994. Four panels appeared at the hearing. One

10. Revised Notice of Establishment of United States National Administrative Office and Procedural Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660-62 (1994).
11. Letter from Edward C. Potter, McGuinness & Williams, Washington, D.C., for the U.S.
Council on International Business, to the U.S. NAO (Feb. 15, 1994) (on file with the U.S. NAO).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. NAALC, supra note 3, art. 23.
16. Id. art. 15.
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panel was composed of national officers
from each of the two unions
17
from Honeywell and General Electric.
Panel Two consisted of one worker from each of the two plants who
claimed that they were fired because of their attempt to form a union.
They gave very detailed testimony about what was said inside the office
and were accompanied by the union organizer who gave an overview of
the union's experience with the Junta and the Conciliation and Arbitration
18
Board.
Panel Three was a panel of four Mexican labor lawyers, who gave an
overview of Mexican labor law and described a substantial divergence
between what the law says and what is done in actual practice. 19 Panel
Four was a panel of U.S. labor attorneys and a Canadian labor expert
who sought to bring a comparative perspective to the hearing. 20 The
NAO secretary actually resisted their testimony, insisting that they were
really there to look at events in Mexico and not to hear about Canadian
2
or Mexican comparative experiences . 1
Let me conclude with this prediction. The guidelines mandate that a
report with findings and recommendations be prepared within three weeks.
This becomes very sensitive because findings cannot be made without
making some judgments, and recommendations, in turn, cannot be made
without implying that some Party is not living up to the terms of the
agreement.
There are a number of long range issues of interest to lawyers. Keep
in mind that underlying the labor side agreement is the principle that
each country still has the power to formulate and enforce its own labor
laws and only the effectiveness of enforcement can be reviewed. For
some time, there has been movement away from the traditional notions
of sovereignty toward a more common, multilateral approach. It is quite
normal for the labor side agreement and the NAOs to be moving in the
same direction.
Michael O'Neill: First, this is a highly emotional process for the two
companies that were involved, considering the rules that were promulgated,
the organization that was set up to provide the nucleus of an operative
forum, and that the U.S. NAO decided to be a tribunal. The NAO has
absolutely no resources and no authority, but it is attempting to act
because of political pressure. The system, however, can work as long as
it is understood that a worldwide NLRB was not created. It is thus
irrelevant that the labor grievances arose before 1994.
17. See Written Statement from Ron Carey and Amy Newell to the U.S. NAO (Sept. 12, 1994)
(on file with U.S. NAO).
18. See Written Statements from Fernando Castro, Ofelia Medrano, Benedicto Martinez and
Robin Alexander to the U.S. NAO (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
19. See Written Statements from Arturo Alcalde, Jesfis Campos Linas, Jorge Ferndndez Sousa
and Gustavo de la Rosa to the U.S. NAO (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
20. See Written Presentation by Judith A. Scott and Written Statement of Chris Schenk, Ontario
Federation of Labor, Possible Recommendations and Agenda for Consultation by the NAO (Sept.
12, 1994) (on file with U.S. NAO).
21. Transcript of Public Hearing from U.S. NAO at 110 (Sept. 12, 1994) (on file with U.S.
NAO).
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The International Business Roundtable has taken the position that by
its own procedures and authority, the NAO cannot hear the two labor
union complaints. The governments of Mexico, Canada and the United
States are not asking the NAO to make a decision as to whether the
Mexican Labor Board or the NLRB needs to be fixed, or whether. they
are doing their job properly. The NAO also cannot make a decision on
the issue of whether there is no cross-examination, no subpoena power
and no investigatory power vested in the NAO.
The National Association of Manufacturers and other business persons
have argued that these issues were settled by the Mexican Labor Board.
Ofelia Medrano, one of the fired workers, agreed to a settlement. It was
done in accordance with Mexican law when she signed an agreement
stating that said she was rightfully terminated. I do not believe the NAO
is empowered to go back and review that decision.
The other troubling aspect from a business perspective is that the NAO
position is counter-productive to the goals of worldwide business and
trade. Global competition has driven management to wake up, and to
recognize that human assets require attention. Workers can be very
valuable if empowered and allowed to solve their problems. In fact, if
empowered enough, workers do not require management and, consequently, the management force can be reduced. The days of smoke-filled
negotiation rooms with labor unions hammering out a contract are the
"good-and-gone days" of the 1950s. United States industry and manufacturing associations agree with the guiding principles of the NAALC.
United States business also supported the labor side agreement and labor
protections for young people, minimum employment standards, freedom
of association, and the right to organize. These labor rights are all
protected and guaranteed-they are in our company policies, our code
of conduct and our global standards of ethics.
The NAO was wrong in accepting these submissions. This brings up
the issue of credibility of the NAO. If the NAO becomes a forum for
membership drives for a union, it is not going to have credibility. In
this case, the Business Roundtable submission of the judicial ruling from
the Mexican Labor Board to the NAO, prior to the acceptance of the
complaint, should have resolved the issue.
Second, accepting such submissions is costly. International businesses
make decisions about where to produce based on very minor differences.
The difficulty of doing business, created by administrative organizations,
is factored in by financial analysts. The costs associated with defending
this issue becomes a cost of doing business and goes on the books of
Honeywell Mexico. A process that does not work becomes more expensive
and less competitive.
This process must be made to work because there are intrinsic benefits
for business, which were hard lessons learned in the 1970s and the 1980s.
Also, if a company does business in ninety-five countries, for example,
conflicts are inevitable. It makes good business sense not to destroy the
environment and to invest in human assets. That would be more effective
than creating an ill-equipped and unauthorized tribunal.
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Robert Herzstein: From our discussion, the central issue is what kinds
of cases the NAO should take and what procedures it should follow. A
key provision is Article 16.3, which says that, "each NAO shall provide
for the submission and receipt and periodically publish a list of public
communications on labor law matters arising in the territory of another
party." ' 22 Another key provision states, "each NAO shall review such
matters as appropriate in accordance with domestic procedures. ' 23 As
Mr. Compa has pointed out, this language is susceptible to both broad
and narrow readings. If read broadly, the NAALC establishes an elaborate, quasi-judicial forum. Conversely, it could be read very narrowly
to say one person has full power to review. Those are both in accordance
with domestic procedures. It is very hard to assert that the NAO provision
does anything other than represent an agreement by the three countries
that each government is supposed to administer its NAO with complete
discretion.
One concern is that each government may exercise discretion that is
consistent with the overall purposes of the NAALC. The NAOs of each
nation should accomplish the kind of cooperative progress that the NAALC
is designed to achieve. The question becomes how far should NAO
guidelines go and what level of scrutiny should the NAO accord to
communications from the public regarding labor law matters arising in
the territory of another party? There are millions of workers going to
work every day in each of the three countries where there are very
complex laws governing the behavior of millions of different employers.
There are thousands of violations occurring every day. Any lawyer who
has worked on labor law matters knows how everyone has a different
version of reality and the law is not equipped to arrive at a "truthful"
resolution. Consequently, the NAFTA nations must not establish a practice
of making it easy to "point fingers" at violations taking place in other
countries.
The kind of situation where there is continual finger-pointing would
be inconsistent with the establishment of a sound and cooperative trading
relationship among the three countries. Thus, the question becomes what
kind of guidelines or criteria are needed by the NAOs for accepting
matters for review under Article 16.3? Without providing an answer, I
believe there is some danger in the guidelines that the U.S. Labor
Department has adopted which seem to establish a presumption that
hearings will be held. 24 Furthermore, these regulations provide for findings,
when the language in the NAALC does not provide for NAO findings.
The presumption that the U.S. NAO will conduct public hearings and
issue findings facilitates the use of the NAO as a tribunal. That process
is not appropriate in some cases, but one must be very discreet about

22. NAALC, supra note 3, art. 16.
23. Id.
24. See Revised Notice of Establishment of United States National Administrative Office and
Procedural Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660-62 (1994).
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when it is used. There is undoubtedly an interaction between the standard
for accepting cases and what kind of hearings should be conducted.
There is a high standard for accepting cases, and perhaps it is appropriate
to have a hearing in every case. Perhaps having a hearing in every case
with a low standard creates the "finger-pointing" phenomenon referred
to earlier.
Jorge Pirez-L6pez: The U.S. NAO intends to remain faithful to the
agreement. The NAO recognizes that there are differences among the
three countries in the way business is conducted. When a public hearing
is held, the NAO clearly indicates that it is an information-gathering
hearing, not an adjudicatory process. The NAO is not trying to find
right or wrong, or determine whether the workers were fired for a
particular reason; it is trying to keep its focus on the obligations of the
agreement by determining whether the governments are enforcing their
labor laws. That is the NAO's intention and focus.
I am familiar with some of the challenges that are being made, such
as the letter oi behalf of the U.S. Council for International Business.
Like Mr. O'Neill, I wish the letter had not raised the issue of jurisdiction.
Article 49 of the NAALC makes clear that the only place where the25
date of entry becomes relevant is in the definition of a pattern of practice.
The pattern of practice is a threshold for an Evaluation Committee of
Experts. The issues before the NAO at the present time are not appropriate
subject matters for the Evaluation Committee of Experts. These are not
matters that are subject to dispute resolution because an Evaluation
26
Committee of Experts is a prerequisite for dispute resolution.
Smith: Any international trade agreement significantly deals, in negotiation and in the agreement itself, with the issue of transparency.
How does the system really work in Mexico, Canada and the United
27
States? Mr. P~rez-L6pez stated, in accordance with the FederalRegister,
that the purpose of a hearing is to gather information so that there can
be more clarity about the whole process of organizing the severance
packages. If transparency and information-gathering is at issue, what is
wrong with the NAO doing just that, do they not have an o6ligation
and why not in the context of a particular controversy?
O'Neill: Exactly. The NAO was created to deal with issues between
countries, not between private parties.
Smith: But you would agree that it is perfectly legitimate for the NAO
to carry out an information-gathering hearing?
O'Neill: The Business Roundtable supported the labor side agreement
for review of those issues. But the NAO is not equipped to deal with
private controversies between labor and management.
Compa: The union submissions happened to involve Honeywell and
General Electric, but it could have been any number of other companies.

25. NAALC, supra note 3, art. 49.
26. Id. art. 27.
27. See supra note 10.
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It is unrealistic to expect this process of review to take place in a vacuum.
The fact is that the scope of NAO review is labor law matters arising
in the other countries, without necessarily narrowing it to enforcement.
Enforcement is driven by cases and, realistically, this process will not
occur without cases and controversies.
O'Neill: But there are substantial costs involved here.
Herzstein: There is also the danger that it discourages companies from
investing in Mexico.
Compa: Again, it is a question of perspective. The labor side agreement
is really very modest. It is unlikely that a controversy would ever get
to the point of sanctions. The thought that a company would not invest
in Mexico because of the NAALC seems to exaggerate its effects.
Abdon Herndndez: Labor unions in the United States normally tend
to defend and protect the interests of their workers. Labor unions in
Mexico originally were created to protect and defend the interests of
workers. However, Mexican labor unions are no longer devoted to that
objective. They are instead almost exclusively devoted to political ends.
It is very risky to get involved in the internal politics of the unions of
another country. If a Mexican-owned company gets involved in a similar
case, how is the NAO going to get the facts?
Pdrez-L6pez: The NAO, indeed, has no subpoena powers. In fact, it
is quite clear in the agreement that the U.S. NAO has no ability to go
into Mexico. The U.S. NAO is aware of the sovereignty issues and is
not going to violate them.
Bill Kryzda: What is the purpose of the committee or hearings?
O'Neill: The system has to be designed to elicit truth; it cannot simply
bring in someone, who is paid by another party, to testify and expect
to get the truth.
Smith: But the issue is not whether a worker was fired for union
activity. The issue is whether or not the enforcement of the right to
organize and engage in collective bargaining in Mexico is being thwarted
by private and public practices that render that particular right a nullity.
Pirez-Ldpez: The intention of the hearings was not to focus on whether
somebody got fired, but to look at whether the government of Mexico
enforces its labor law with regard to freedom of association and collective
bargaining.
Compa: This is a fair point and it may be healthy for the NAO to
move in that direction. It will be necessary for the unions to educate
themselves about the possibility of a generalized review of practices,
without getting into specific companies. The problem is that there were
specific incidents that took place in companies where there was a degree
of cooperation between U.S. and Mexican unions. Workers and unions
in both countries are used to a system of filing a charge or making a
denuncia. They naturally tend to think of this as the first thing to do.
Because the guidelines contemplate public communications, it happened
that the first public communication took the form of a complaint that
specified what happened at a specific company. But this is a valid criticism,
and it behooves the unions to think more strategically and globally.

